

A Tale of Two 'Kenyas': An African Case of Societal Securitization

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ABSTRACT

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Coastal Kenya has been subjected to terror attacks with alarming frequency, and an active insurgency is on the rise. Dwindling security threatens the stability of Kenya, with the coast being imperative for tourism revenue. It is vital that the Kenyan government acts to provide security. This thesis explores why the government of Kenya chooses to engage in ethnic profiling of Somalis, instead of engaging the true causes of insecurity. Securitization theory provides the framework to understand the motivations of Kenyan security policies. This thesis argues that Kenyan authorities seek to securitize Kenyan society by scapegoating marginalized Somalis and Muslims. To gain a full picture of security, 25 semi-structured interviews were collected in Malindi, Kenya in June 2014. Kenyan citizens recognize that the government in Nairobi ought to provide security for all citizens. Only through exploring disconnects between citizen perceptions of security and official policies can a full picture of security be understood.

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INTRODUCTION

Security in Kenya has been deteriorating. Since 2011, the Somalia based terror group Al-Shabaab has launched a series of coordinated and deadly attacks against the Kenyan people. Although the Coast and Northeastern provinces have experienced the majority of the violence, one of the most publicized attacks occurred in a popular shopping mall in Nairobi. The Westgate Mall shooting left nearly 70 dead and more than 170 wounded. Despite the plethora of media attention the Westgate attack received, Al-Shabaab has concentrated their efforts predominately in areas that have high concentrations of Muslims. Mombasa, in addition to being home of the largest port in East Africa, has been a focal point for Al-Shabaab. Several grenade, improvised explosive device, and targeted killings have occurred in the once sought after tourist epicenter. Other attacks have been launched in Lamu, Mandera, and most recently Garissa, despite being less populated these communities have been forced to bury their neighbors and loved ones in droves. The dwindling security situation forces the government to act, and to provide security for its citizens.

Security as a unit of analysis requires a framework to understand the motivations and foundations behind security policies. Securitization theory provides the framework to explore the rationale behind security policies. The central question this thesis investigates is why does Kenya--ostensibly a democracy—engage in security policies that are exclusive, and predicated on ethnicity? By investigating the motivations and rationale behind abusive and undemocratic security practices, this project brings to light how ethnicity is the guiding force behind official security strategies in Kenya. The political

dimensions of ethnicity are not hidden behind the scenes, nor do they exist only within the context of contentious politics. By analyzing Kenyan security operations and speech-acts of politicians, it is clear that Kenyan authorities are not prepared to engage marginalized Kenyans in hopes of swaying them from the grip of Al-Shabaab. Instead authorities ‘play the ethnic’ card that portrays Christians and Kikuyu as “true” Kenyans, while Muslims and Somalis are portrayed as the enemy.

The authorities portray ethnic Somalis as being synonymous with terrorism. The mere act of speaking this notion creates the conditions that allow Kenya to engage in security operations that pit Somalis verses “peaceful” Kenyans. While analysis of security policies and discourse that is referred to as speech-acts is crucial in understanding the political dimension of security, it is incomplete. To gain a full spectrum of security, the perceptions and attitudes of individual actors—citizens—is required. Governments that do not take into account the security wants and needs of their citizens fail to provide one of the most basic public goods.

The research employed is qualitative, building off of and contributing to, securitization theory, as well as using data collected from interviews. Through investigating the actions and policies Kenya has employed in the wake of attacks, they are securitizing identity (and thus society) by victim blaming Somali-Kenyans and conflating Muslim with terrorist. While scholarship on conflict and terrorism in Africa is bountiful, securitization theory has been an under utilized tool in the Africanists’ Rolodex. The Kenyan case furthers Securitization theory and builds on its ability to travel to disparate regions outside of Europe.

In order to fully evaluate the efficacy of state responses, interviews were collected regarding the perceptions of security. Chapter 3 who uses data from 25 semi-structured interviews collected in Malindi, Kenya during June of 2014. 13 men and 12 women—all Muslims—were interviewed about their perceptions of security. Malindi Kenya sits almost halfway between Mombasa and Lamu counties, two areas that have experienced several attacks, and has a predominantly Muslim population. Many citizens of Malindi have economic and social ties to Somalia, in addition to living under constant threat from Al-Shabaab. The sample is reflective of the types of people that were most accessible. Nearly all had some connection to the service industry. This is not particularly surprising or problematic given that Malindi contains pristine beaches and has been a prominent tourist destination. Snowballing was not used to increase the sample. Potential interviewees were approached either at work, or in public spaces, such as outdoor markets. Not using snowballing was a conscious choice. It is possible that individuals interviewed could tell their friends and family about the questions and guide them to specific answers that are either advantageous for them, or that may be perceived by me as being the “correct” responses.

My intention of the sample is not to be generalized to the rest of the country. Rather it represents ethnic and religious minorities who look to the government and politicians in Nairobi to provide security and to quell the violence. Political power has been concentrated with people of Kikuyu ethnicity. The security policies and operations have been have been employed by Kikuyu for Kikuyu. It is important in a democracy (even one that is partial, and fragile such as Kenya’s) that marginalized people have their

voices heard. This sample represents citizens who are stuck in between being at the mercy of Al-Shabaab, and their own government.

This thesis explores two dimensions of security in Kenya: the responses of the state, and perceptions of security by its citizens. The Kenyan state can no longer stand idly by while an international group continues to terrorize its citizens. In order to investigate the motivations and reasoning of particular security policies, Securitization theory (The Copenhagen School) is employed. While Chapter 1 will go into detail what Securitization theory is and why it will be used in this thesis, it is important to clarify some of its basics. Securitization theory, coming out of the IR tradition, seeks to explain how and why certain issues get pushed into a realm of exceptional politics—that requires exceptional responses. Issues that are labeled ‘issues of national security’ do not emerge out of nothing; they are constructed overtime, and like other dimensions of politics, favor certain groups over others. Those who are able to pull the levers of government control the discourse and actions of security.

Securitization, as a lens, allows for threats to be treated not as threats, but of political issues, which become securitized. As a theory, securitization looks beyond the urgency that authorities sell to their audience and asks why a particular issue becomes securitized and not another. Authorities frame security threats in such a way that to do nothing would be neglectful to their duties. Securitization provides researchers and analysts a framework to critically examine the motivations behind an act of security. Securitization theory as a framework, which is discussed in detail in chapter 1, brings the political back into focus. Authorities that securitize certain issues-- that are deemed as dangerous threats—do so out of political gain. The fallacy that a threat rises to the top of

a security agenda requires a substantial response if brought to light using securitization theory. Securitization as a framework is used as a critical tool to understand the political dimension of an issue that is presented as an apolitical threat.

Security studies have concentrated on international security, and as such, has focused on international variables. This thesis scales security and conflict down to the state level. By investigating domestic institutions and actors, this thesis seeks to shift the burden of security away from international organizations, transnational institutions, and powerful states and onto the shoulders of governments that are charged with providing security, one of the most basic of public goods that governments ought to provide.

Chapter 2 applies Securitization theory to Kenya. Through the lens of Securitization, this thesis argues that the current Kenyatta regime seeks to securitize identity by extending the coercive arm of the state and targeting and scapegoating marginalized ethnic and religious minority groups.

The aim of this thesis is to explore disconnects between Kenyan state policy and discourse, and frames of individual Kenyan citizens. Disconnects between what official state policy is and what marginalized citizens expect highlight the priorities of elites.

Chapter 1 investigates competing conceptualizations of security, and lays the theoretical framework for analyzing the security policies of the Kenyan state. Kenya has engaged in policies and discourse, through speech-acts, that align with societal securitization.

Chapter 2 describes Kenyan policies since independence.

Chapter 3 explores security expectations of citizens of Coastal Kenya. Twenty-five Semi-structured interviews were collected from Muslims in Malindi, Kenya. Coastal

citizens overwhelmingly identify that the government in Nairobi shoulders the burden of providing security. Economic security is of utmost concern. Realizing tourism is a vital industry, security must be provided to ensure tourists flock to Kenya's pristine beaches and resorts along the coast. These perceptions are important regarding security policy. If a minority population feels they are marginalized and not of significance to the state, there is no implicit trust. The ability for a country to provide security is predicated on support from the local populatio

CHAPTER 1: CONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY

Security has different meanings to different people. The notion of a citizen having security indicates a certain level of safety. Security has evolved from Individuals demanding protection from competing clans, to safety from other politically organized bodies—states, to eventually safety from over-bearing government intrusion. For an individual, security is a necessary facet for modern human existence. For those who stand at the levers of governance, security is something that is to be provided, as well as something that is to be guaranteed. This broad conceptualization of an ambiguous term includes every actor of politics.

In order for *security* to be analyzed, it must be defined. This thesis defines security as “The move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”.¹ The logic is clear: if ‘threats’ are deemed exceptional and outside of the purview of “regular” politics then security and securitization (the solutions) can operate outside of normal political life. This chapter discusses various conceptualizations of security, and puts forth a framework for understanding how states may grip with instances of “insecurity”. By describing trends and popular theories of security, this chapter lays the groundwork for investigating how the Kenyan state seeks to securitize as a response to insecurity caused by Al-Shabaab, via the Copenhagen School. There are however, competing theories and frameworks, for understanding security. Before delving into securitization, I examine other possible lenses of security.

¹ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 23.

Human Security

Within International Relations, a new framework has been established; human security. Human Security breaks from the I.R. tradition of state-centric conceptualizations of security. Instead, it is primarily of concern for the welfare and safety of individuals. Once thought to be a new-dawn for security analysts, Human Security has proven to be too vague to be a shift of analysis of action. First introduced in Norway in 1988, 'Human Security' seeks to serve the identities of liberal democratic states, as well as the coffers of NGOs.

The 'Human Security' network (HSN) that emerged, spearheaded by Norway and Canada², promote human security internationally. Instead of concentrating on security of states, Human Security seeks to place emphasis on security of the individual. The pivot away from the security of states' borders and institutions include access to basic necessities required to sustain human life. Water, food, and shelter are of particular concern for proponents of Human Security. Discourse and action surrounding Human Security became grounded in 1994 when the United Nations Human Development Report (HDR) embraced the title *New Dimensions of Human Security*.³ Despite the term being vague and ambiguous, organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) champion the language of Human Security.

Discourses of Human Security that are conflated with development serve the organizations that advocate for it. Strength of the term is its potential to mobilize actors throughout the international system. It can unite academics, activists, and political actors

² Other observing states include Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Slovenia, Switzerland and Thailand, and South Africa.

³ United Nations Development Programme (HDR), *New Dimensions of Human Security* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1994

in hopes of yielding tangible results that ultimately improve the lives of individuals. The term is the glue binds a community of states, and seeks to divert funds and other resources away from traditional security concerns towards issues, which have conventionally been housed under efforts of international development.⁴ When development is securitized the meaning becomes much too wide to implement meaningful policy. The lines between Human Security and human rights become blurred. Labels such as human rights and Human Security can be employed without providing long-lasting positive change for its citizens.⁵

The marriage between Human Development and Human Security pushes the boundaries of security studies. HIV/AIDS has been securitized under a Human Security narrative. This challenges the traditional notion of security analyses in that military security does not hold in the balance. Seemingly apolitical issues can be breathed into spheres of security. Infectious diseases have been securitized being that extremely deadly ones pose a global threat. Malaria, Dengue fever, as well as HIV/AIDS have been securitized by Western states and the World Health Organization (WHO) The WHO, backed by Western powers, is charged with the governance and management of global health.⁶ There is no doubt that HIV/AIDS in the Global South can 'threaten' economies and destabilize societies. It is also widely accepted that the solutions of this epidemic lie in various levels of political organization. Distinctions must be drawn between

⁴ Paris, Roland. "Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?." *International security* 26, no. 2 (2001): 87-102.

⁵ Booth, Ken. *Theory of world security*. Vol. 105. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁶ Davies, Sara E. "Securitizing infectious disease." *International Affairs* 84, no. 2 (2008): 295-313.

practitioners and students of international politics. By pushing issues of development and global health into the realm of security, activists and NGOs garner attention, which may result in increased funding and awareness.

Practitioners are not neutral investigators of politics. Actors to consciously elicit a particular outcome can speak specific issues into the world of security as a method. Within this conceptualization, any issue can be one of 'security' as long as there are individuals and organizations that wish for a particular outcome. Employing Human Security as a lens for analysis is vacuous given its vague and increasing widening.

Why National Security?

National security is a consequence of anarchy at the international level. The responsibility to ensure the state is secure falls to the shoulders of the state itself. This is because the state itself remains the primary actor in international relations (p.82).⁷ If a state determines that they have a situation, which requires security, they can only look inward. The state not only has the opportunity to secure itself, it has the responsibility to do so. Sweden and the United Kingdom have the same task as Sri Lanka and Lebanon; state survival. This notion of self-help stems from realism, a theory of international relations, in which the structure of a system rather than the process of learning and interaction explain state behavior.⁸ The systemic condition of anarchy enshrines that states must help themselves. State strength has no impact on the condition of anarchy, which privileges and burdens states simultaneously. The lack of a centralized global government prohibits states from petitioning another entity with institutional power to

⁷ David Singer, J. "The level-of-analysis problem in international relations." *World Politics* 14, no. 01 (1961): 77-92.

⁸ Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics." *International organization* 46, no. 02 (1992): 391-425.

govern individual states. Such an arrangement would mimic the structures of a federal system. States have remained the primary actor in international politics, and anarchy is the by-product of the international system. It logically follows that states are unique actors, which are linked to being the masters of their own destiny, or sovereignty.

Security and sovereignty are linked at the international level. The Thirty Years War, and the subsequent Treaty of Westphalia, ushered in the era of sovereignty. Among the basic tenants of sovereignty is that states carry the burden for security of its citizens. Sovereignty and security are entangled with one another. Many analysts' and scholars' conceptualization of sovereignty and security are that the two phenomena are separate. Samuel Makinda posits that security, at the global level, is a reflection of sovereignty⁹. Global security once meant the process by which states ensured their survival. This was characterized by the bi-polar system of the "First" and "Second" worlds. Terminology of states being located in an ordering system represented numerically has been melded with geopolitical class structure; mainly a "Global North" and "South". Whether ordered numerically or geographically, classification of states is placeholders for those who are located at the center, periphery, or semi-periphery of the international system.¹⁰ States outside of Europe, mainly located in the "Global South", never had the opportunity to forge nations and draw borders according to local practices and norms. That process was done for them by colonial powers; the effects of which are still being observed. The North-South divide is a way to determine where power is vested and where resources go.

⁹ Makinda, Samuel M. "Sovereignty and global security." *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 3 (1998): 281-292.

¹⁰ Buzan, Barry. "New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century." *International Affairs* (1991): 431-451.

All states have sovereignty, but the strength of the state itself is telling as to how and if they are able to secure themselves.

Sovereignty is conceptualized as being empirical and juridical. Empirical sovereignty occurs when the state is willing and able to provide the goods and services a state ought to provide. This normative dimension of sovereignty permeates throughout the current global system. States in the Global South are expected to act as a state *should*. One of the most basic goods states ought to provide to its citizens is security. The expectation of the new states, which were plunged onto the international stage at the dawn of independence, to govern and compete internationally was not realistic. Suddenly the onus for development, governance, and security fell to the shoulders of the emerging post-colonial state. The autocratic nature of governance in 'new' post-colonial states has contributed to the identification of the puzzle that if states are to provide security, why have some not been able, or unwilling to provide security? Juridical sovereignty is constructed at the international level. The legal right of individual states to exist is rooted in other states recognizing that state. The international dimension does impact whether a geographical area will be enshrined with the rights of statehood. This is how the world has witnessed an Eritrea and South Sudan emerging in 1993 and 2011, respectively but not an independent Somaliland. New states can bear out of the dissolution of a parent-federalized state, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, or they can be carved out of an established state, such as Kosovo and East Timor. The method of how states gain sovereignty has no impact on that once they step foot onto the international stage, the shift from being securitized to securitizing occurs instantaneously. Security cannot be provided if a state has juridical sovereignty, but lacks empirical sovereignty. The system

of anarchy and the international community recognizing Yemen, Somalia, and Central African Republic as having juridical sovereignty does not a strong state make. These states lack empirical sovereignty, in that they are unable or unwilling to provide the basic needs of individuals to its citizens. A state cannot secure anything if they have juridical, but not empirical sovereignty. A country that has juridical, but lacks empirical sovereignty equals a failing state. States that have juridical and empirical sovereignty employ different methods of securitization in the name of national security.

Ethnic Security Dilemma

Political conflicts have led scholars to apply ‘The Security Dilemma’ to interethnic strife. Security is a political goal. Instances of insecurity are constructed, and emerge when discourse is centered on, at the very least, a perceived threat. Security as a concept has been studied at the international level. Barry Posen (1993) borrows ‘the security dilemma’ from the International Relations (IR) theory of Realism to explain when and why some ethnic groups engage in violence. His application of ‘the security dilemma’ to Serbs and Croats within the former Yugoslavia, as well as Russians and Ukrainians in Eastern Ukraine, highlight the state-centricity of this particular lens. Posen’s findings suggest Serb-Croat violence is more likely to occur than Russian-Ukrainian violence¹¹. This is due to the distribution of Serbs in Croatia, coupled with the disastrous history between these two groups. Through this conceptualization the security of ethnic Serbs in Croatia can only be reached by a Serbian military response¹². The

¹¹ Posen, Barry R. "The security dilemma and ethnic conflict." *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): P. 42.

¹² Ibid.

application of ‘The Security Dilemma’ to explain ethnic conflict lacks the ability to be generalized, and exported to other cases.

The cases selected for Posen’s analysis meet the precondition of anarchy, which does not exist in other instances of ethnic conflict. Serbia and Croatia, like Ukraine and Russia enjoy sovereignty. Serbs and Croats existed under the umbrella of Yugoslavia, an amalgam constructed by Europe following World War I. The borders of Yugoslavia, while constructed, benefited from sovereignty. The collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992 propelled Serbs and Croats in a state of anarchy. Similarly, the fall of the former Soviet Union ushered several Eastern European states onto the international stage. Ukraine became a sovereign state, independent of a Soviet Russia, in 1990.¹³ Ukrainians and ethnic-Russians alike fell under the state apparatus of a new independent Ukraine. States serve the purpose of being able to house various types of people. Theoretically, individuals within an aggrieved group can petition the state. If the state apparatus has either dissolved, or otherwise absent, the onus of security falls to the groups themselves. Border changes are rare. The collapse of Yugoslavia and USSR are exceptional and are not the rule. This application explains ethnic conflict in groups that have been thrust into anarchy.

Anarchy lowers the cost of collective action. The absence of state apparatuses (such as defense nodes, legal institutions, etc...) shifts the burden of security to the shoulders of the group. Groups such as the Séléka rebels in the Central African Republic, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the Taliban in Afghanistan have assumed responsibility for security over its claimed territory and the people living within. These examples highlight

¹³ July 16th, 1990 the Ukrainian parliament declared the right of the self-determination of Ukraine.

the group as the unit of analysis. Sub-national groups do not have access to a set of legitimate sovereign governing tools. Applying ‘the security dilemma’ to groups that do have access to the state such as, the Tutsi led, Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Kikuyu of Kenya is not useful given that they have access to the military. Posen admits that ‘the security dilemma’ becomes more powerful when groups are, more or less, equal militarily¹⁴. Governments assume the responsibility for security and as such sub-national groups, which cause ‘insecurity’, can never be equal militarily. Moreover, domestic policies and laws can be methods of employing violence and conflict. A different analytical lens is required to identify and investigate how and why states engage in such practices.

Securitization Theory

Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde argue that securitization possesses three dimensions.¹⁵ Together the following units construct the foundation for the utilization of securitization theory as a framework for understanding security policies and actions: First, there must be a *referent*. The threat that is deemed by the authorities to be of utmost importance is the referent. Without the referent, there is no existential threat that pressures authorities to act. Those who reach at the lever of securitization are the *securitizing actors*. The securitizing actors are the authorities that securitize an issue; they are the actors that usher in securitization of a “threat” by speaking it into existence. Finally there is the *audience*. The audiences are functional actors, which are distinct from

¹⁴ Ibid P. 28

¹⁵ Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & De Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers. P. 38.

the referent, or the securitizing actor, yet they can dictate the dynamics of securitization. Functional actors should be viewed as the constituency of securitization; they are whom the securitization is done for. Without these three dimensions securitization theory cannot be used to understand what drives security policies.

For states to securitize there must be, or at the very least perceived to be, threats. There are various intimidations, which have been constructed and framed as being threatening to the state, and its citizens. The question of what security *is*, and the answers that follow, reveal that certain issue areas become securitized. Agents of the state have the ability of breathing issues into the sphere of security by stating so.¹⁶ This ability legitimizes certain actions that are considered politics as a necessity, due to its impending 'threat'. The following are the five areas issues within the Copenhagen School (CS), which can become securitized.

The *military security* agenda represents the most traditional version of securitization. The social contract between those who govern, and are governed requires an entity of the state that guarantees security from external and internal threats. Threats, which require a military response, reflect a sincere fear of an attack. Following World War II, the Japanese military has fallen wayside to the importance of their growing economy. National security was not a priority for decades after the American occupation of Japan. This was for two reasons. First, the Yoshida Doctrine that Japan adopted following WWII emphasized development and economic importance. Secondly, America established bases on Japan and surrounding territories. The American military was filling a void that the Japanese sought not to fill. There has, however, been a resurgence of

¹⁶ Williams, Michael C. "Words, images, enemies: securitization and international politics." *International studies quarterly* 47, no. 4 (2003): 511-531.

Japanese military securitization. The threat of North Korean aggression has laid a foundation for Japan to increase their military, albeit slowly.¹⁷ The threat of missiles from Pyongyang has given Japan the opportunity to invest and grow their military.

Environmental security is the newest and one of the most controversial spheres of securitization. Discourse surrounding the environment has only been in existence since 1972 when the U.N. hosted their Conference on the Human Environment.¹⁸ The environmental sphere is different than the other four mentioned because its roots are located outside of the realm of politics. Scientists and research institutions ask questions that the natural world answers. The political realm is entered when discourse is concentrated around responsibility, response, and reaction, to environmental situations, which hamper the continued evolution of human civilization. The environmental and military spheres can be conflated. The symbol of American military power, the Pentagon, has a report discussing why climate change is linked to national security.¹⁹ The depletion of non-renewable energy sources falls within the realm of environmental security. Chernobyl, like Fukushima illicit concern for nuclear energy and the questioned stability of its production. Both of these locations tie together the reality of crisis, and the response of a government to ensure they are protected from such a calamity.

Economic security is controversial and political in nature. The political structure is to anarchy, what the economic structure is to the free market, domestically. Market

¹⁷ Hughes, Christopher W. "" Super-Sizing" the DPRK Threat: Japan's Evolving Military Posture and North Korea." (2009): 291-311.

¹⁸ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

¹⁹ Davenport, Coral. "Pentagon Signals Security Risks of Climate Change" *The New York Times*. (New York City, NY) October, 13th, 2014.

oriented entities, such as firms and other mercantilists; view the state as having the responsibility to protect the ability of individuals, and firms alike, to accumulate wealth. Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde identify two other positions within the economic security sector; Liberals and Socialists. Liberals view economic rights as most inherent²⁰. Social issues and the economy are entwined for liberals, and those who engage in discourse of economic securitization, do so because the goal are to establish ‘rules of the game’ that foster mobility within national economies.²¹ Casteneda finds that Sierra Leone has engaged in the securitization of development following their civil war from 1991-2002.²² The attempted ‘trickle-down’ effect of security of the economic sector (development), to the social sector has been practiced in post-conflict countries, but has also been met with skepticism and critiques by scholars and politicians alike.

Political security being a confusing concerned with threats of state sovereignty. Parsing out the political sphere from any others presented is problematic. Securitization cannot be divorced from politics. When discussing the economic or societal spheres, one is really discussing the “political-economic” sphere, or the “political-societal” sphere.²³ Lines are blurred with the political and other spheres. The military and political spheres were connected when United States invaded Iraq in March of 2003. American military was used to solve the political security threat of Iraq producing weapons of mass

²⁰ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, P. 95.

²¹ IBID

²² Castañeda, Carla. "How Liberal Peacebuilding May be Failing Sierra Leone." *Review of African Political Economy* 36, no. 120 (2009): 235-251.

²³ Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, P. 141.

destruction (WMDs).²⁴ To truly separate the political sphere from others is to ask the critical question of what is politics. The answer to this question, while an important one, is not the focus of this thesis. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the main actor in international politics has been the state. Threats against the organizational institutions and processes of the state are threats to political security.

Societal security is the securitization of those with a specific identity. A collective group of individuals who share a greater identity can be considered a nation. The nation, as a unit of analysis for securitization is a pivot from securitization of the state.

Securitizing using the institutions, practices and norms has fallen to the shoulders of both the military and political security sectors. Nations like other societies, are not fixed entities like states are. They are not bound by occupying a physical space limited by borders. Society is not bound by the constraints of a state.²⁵ There is a logical difference between security of Kurdistan, and of Kurds. Within the Iraqi context, Kurdistan refers to the semi-autonomous region in the North Eastern provinces of the country. Kurds, however, are those who identify as Kurdish, many of which live outside of Iraqi 'Kurdistan'. If society is about identity, it must follow that societal securitization is to secure an identity. Societal securitization has been applied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The perceived threat of Jewish and Israeli identity has led to a "Societal security

²⁴ The threat of Iraq targeting America via WMDs has been debunked; however the perception of the threat was enough to conflate the political and military spheres.

²⁵ Ibid P. 119.

dilemma”²⁶. The Israeli state seeks to securitize Jewish identity and Israeli nationalism by suppressing Palestinians.

Since sectors that require securitization are constructed, there must be a target audience that the securitization process seeks to legitimize the actions. The “audience” is an ambiguous term, which can take on different meanings depending on context. When the United States sought to securitize airline travel, the immediate audience was the droves of travelers that American airports experienced every day. While it is true that architects of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) were charged with increasing security for airline passengers, the broader audience is much broader. Since the United States is a democracy, the audiences are the voters. An electorate is not likely to elect leaders that cannot or do not provide adequate security. For democracies that require a plurality to win an election, the audiences are potential voters. For politicians seeking to gain or retain office, the audience is as many people as possible, so as to increase their chance of support. In a more authoritarian context, the audiences are those who ensure survival of the regime. Under less politically open regimes, the audience is narrowed to oligarchs, which have a vested interest in the status-quo. The size of the audience is dependent on the regime type.

Proponents of the Copenhagen School, most notably Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, sought to widen security studies, but CS theory has not been without criticism. Wilkenson identifies that Securitization theory contains a “Westphalian

²⁶ Olesker, Ronnie. "Israel's Societal Security Dilemma and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 17, no. 4 (2011): 382-401.

straitjacket”²⁷. She contends that similar institutions, norms, bind not all states and practices commonly found in liberal Western democracies. Exposing securitization theory as Eurocentric presents the question of is this theory applicable to non-European, non-western states. She attempts to apply CS theory to Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution’ of 2005. Kyrgyzstan, a weak and floundering state, has been under the influence of Russia even after the fall of the former Soviet Union. She finds that the relationship between speech and action, that CS is predicated on, did not take place in Kyrgyzstan in the months preceding the revolution.²⁸ Instead of emerging security actors, who are able to mobilize and frame threats as an issue area that requires “securitization”, competing narratives at the local and national level may exist and operate simultaneously. As in major I.R. theories, CS privileges the state as the primary actor. ‘The state’ cannot alone solve security problems. Various states with disparate histories and formations all have the burden of security. The next logical question is the security of what, exactly? It is with this premise that states begin to securitize issues.

The international community securitizes issues and groups when it is seen as a threat globally. Sub-national groups can be formed out of the absence of a governing authority. Somali pirates are a group that has been ‘securitized’ by the international community. The discourse on piracy in the Gulf of Aden has shifted at the international level. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has garnered the attention of the international

²⁷ Wilkinson, Claire. "The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?." *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 1 (2007): 5-25 .

²⁸ Ibid, p. 16.

community since 2008, when pirates began to seize vessels carrying oil²⁹. Piracy in Somalia, like potential infectious disease outbreaks, exist independent of normal politics into a sphere of special politics. Special politics calls for irregular, yet legitimate actions. These issues are malleable and security discourse is invoked when it serves economic or political advantages.

States securitize what is perceived to be an outside threat; however, some 'threats' come from within. The 1989 student-led protests in Tiananmen Square were condemned and rejected as being revolutionary in nature. Official estimates range from 200 to 300 people killed at the hands of the Chinese state. Student protests are a staple in democratic countries. The securitization of student protests served the Chinese state. Democracies, autocracies, and regimes somewhere between all engage in securitization. CS has focused heavily on Europe, and democratic states. Securitization of Tiananmen Square illustrates how securitization theory has abilities to transcend diverse regions of the world, and among disparate regime types.

Within CS there is no room for actors other than states to securitize. The CS privileges the state as its unit of analysis. First, CS was developed and applied to I.R. The field of I.R. is concerned with the relationships between and among states. It is therefore reasonable and expected that a theory conceptualized under this cannon would be applied at the state level. Ultimately I.R. scholars, particularly theorists, seek to explain individual behavior. Individuals pulling the levers of governance control the state. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is viewed as a unilateral action by the American state against another. This does not suggest, however, that the action was not a result of individuals;

²⁹ Tsvetkova, Bilyana. "Securitizing piracy off the coast of Somalia." *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* 3, no. 1 (2009): 44-63.

namely George W. Bush and others in the administration. Anyone can claim anything to be an issue of security, but securitization occurs when those in power utilize the levers of governance to provide 'safety' from a threat. Since comparative politics focuses on domestic structures and actors, individuals in power (or those who control the levers of the state) are of concern to the sub-field. Also of concern to comparative politics are citizens. Individuals, which make up the nation, and those living on the periphery, are crucial to politics, and the study thereof. While 'securitization theory' has the ability to explain why states securitize certain issues, it cannot be applied to individual frames of security.

African Security

Security research has been concentrated mainly on international relations (I.R.). Applying I.R. theory to Africa has proved to be testing.³⁰ I.R. theories do not, however, take into account how individuals frame security when faced with possible threats. Security studies as a discipline remains state-centric and that *security* as a term is one which has can have disparate meanings and changing norms.³¹ Researchers and policy makers alike should take into account the wants and expectations of the people whom live with their recommendations and actions. By using coastal Kenya as a case study, this paper seeks to fill the gap on security research.

³⁰ I.R. theory has historically been European centric. For criticisms of applying I.R. theories to Africa see Dunn, Kevin C., and Timothy M. Shaw. *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, and Lemke, Douglas. "African lessons for international relations research." *World Politics* 56, no. 01 (2003): 114-138.

³¹ Kolodziej, Edward A. "Renaissance in security studies? Caveat lector!." *International Studies Quarterly* (1992): 421-438.

The scholarship concerning security within African states operates at the state level and above. Security at the state-level can be promoted via international organizations, of which the African Union (AU), is paramount. In May 2004, (AU) birthed a Peace and Security Council (PSC). This 15-member organization, must meet certain criteria before being called to promote peace and security.³² While research on the PSC is still in its infancy, Williams finds that their efficacy comes into question as they have never been mobilized for military intervention.³³ The AU has, however, mobilized missions to promote peace and to provide security. The AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) mobilized some 3,000+ AU soldiers, mostly from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa, to build peace and promote security in the central African country. Eventually partnering with the United Nations, AMIB was able to quell violence before it started since 2003 Burundi was on the verge of collapse. From 2004-2007 the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) sought to make peace in Darfur. While this proved to be the chance for the AU to promote peace and security while an ongoing conflict was taking place, AMIS did not rise to the occasion. The UN took over control of the mission in December of 2007. One last AU mission worth mentioning is the ongoing mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Having been in place since 2007, AMISOM has been charged with promoting security in Mogadishu in addition to supporting dialogue for reconciliation.³⁴

While the AU and its sub-regional partners are important for peacebuilding and

³² See AU 2005a: para. A-1

³³ Williams, Paul D. "The Peace and Security Council of the African Union: evaluating an embryonic international institution." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, no. 04 (2009): 603-626.

³⁴ For more information of these AU mission in comparative perspective see Murithi, Tim. "The African Union's evolving role in peace operations: the African Union Mission in Burundi, the African Union Mission in Sudan and the African Union Mission in Somalia." *African Security Review* 17, no. 1 (March 2008): 70-82.

peacemaking within the continent, these interventions only occur after citizens of these countries have been living in a state of insecurity for quite some time. By the time international organizations provide support to suppress violence, scores of individuals have perished, or at the least, their lives are in danger.

The above, while important to security situations of African states, lacks an important facet. Marginalized communities exist in every society, yet not all marginalized group fears for their lives. Coastal Kenya offers the opportunity to glimpse into the psyche of citizens who have traditionally been sidelined by their national government. Individual security frames take into account how people in their own country view the efficacy of their government. Recalling that security is a public good afforded by governments, the perceptions about the provision of security shed light onto how a particular community is prioritized by its parent government.

Individual frames of security are away to measure perceptions of governance. Since the burden of security falls upon states, individuals who live under conditions of insecurity, whether perceived or 'real', are instructive as to how they are treated by the state.

CHAPTER 2: SOCIETAL SECURITIZATION IN KENYA

While the previous chapter focused on security and securitization, this chapter will apply Securitization theory to the case of Kenya. Like other forms of securitization, Kenyan authorities engage in societal Securitization through speech-acts. Securitization, as framework, does not exist without governments breathing it into life. Without a doubt, Al-Shabaab is a legitimate, tangible threat, however, the Kenyan government does not securitize the Somali based terrorist group. The conflation of Somalis and Muslims with Al-Shabaab, and therefore terror, creates the “reality” of the majority of Kenyans are peaceful. Somalis and Muslims are independent of greater Kenyan society being that they are the “true” threat. Authorities control the discourse on security. The speech-acts that the Kenyatta regime has engaged in frame Somalis and Muslims as the root-cause of insecurity in Kenya. Efforts to scapegoat ethnic and religious communities are political choices that are compounded by the reality of ethnic politics in Kenya.

Identity Politics in Kenya

Kenya has long been characterized as a deeply divisive multi-ethnic country. The government recognizes 43 ethnic groups, however, the Kikuyu have been the most powerful ethnic group since independence. Uhuru Kenyatta is not the first of his line to rule. His father Jomo Kenyatta, often heralded as the father of independent Kenya, consolidated power. Political elites became synonymous with Kikuyu. Political, economic, and social domination of the ethnic minority quickly became the norm. The promise by Jomo Kenyatta of a united Kenya, and an overly ambitious united East Africa, was supplanted by a conscious clandestine plan to engage in the manufacturing of two Kenyas.

Within years, Kikuyu spread outside of Nairobi and the Rift Valley Provinces. One area that experienced an influx of Kikuyu migrants was Mpeketoni in Lamu County. Lamu is historically an important Muslim region. In order to stifle a potential food crisis, the government settled Kikuyu. While the local MP, Madhubuti, favored the government policy, local citizens viewed this as an invasion.³⁵ Kikuyu settlements in the predominantly Muslim Coast led to a conflict over land ownership. The new landowners were backed by the government and given deeds, while the Muslims, many of which view themselves as natives, were left with nothing.³⁶

While the decision to move Kikuyu to Mpeketoni has had dire political consequences, it was enshrined in the want to help the Coast. The Coast has historically been one of the most food insecure regions in Kenya. The Rift Valley is home to the Kikuyu and is also the breadbasket for the country. Jomo Kenyatta employed strategic logic to avoid a potential humanitarian disaster of a minority population. Kikuyu families in the Rift Valley and Central provinces, however, needed to have incentives to move to the coast. Guaranteed land ownership was the solution that the government used to persuade Kikuyu. It is important to note that in Tanzania, Kenya's fraternal neighbor, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere forced Tanzanian citizens at gunpoint to load on to trucks and dropped them off in disparate regions of the country. This was a conscious move by the first president to help foster a national identity. This process did not occur in Kenya.

³⁵ Amidu, Assibi A. "The Role of Islam in the political and Social perceptions of the Waswahili of Lamu." *Knowledge, Renewal and Religion* (2009): 236.

³⁶ Okech, A. "Assymmetrical Conflict and Human Security: Reflections From Kenya." *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, (2015) 37(1), 53-74.

Unlike Tanzania, public good provision in Kenya has been predicated on ethnicity.³⁷

The provision of security, and subsequent blame of insecurity, has fallen along ethnic lines.

Terrorism in Kenya

Al-Shabaab is not Kenya's first experience with terrorism. February 1975, just 12 years after Kenya became independent, explosions rocked a Nairobi nightclub. A local business was targeted near a Hilton in central Nairobi. Following the hotel explosion, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, a socialist Kenyan politician, claimed he was targeted while in his car.³⁸ Kenya seemed to be ill equipped to deal with the terror threat. No arrests were made in connection with these events. In early March, Kariuki was kidnapped and killed. The circumstances surrounding his abduction and subsequent murder were quite suspicious. The next attack came in 1980 when an Arab terror group bombed a hotel, again in Nairobi. The motivation for this attack was due to the Kenyan state allowed Israeli aircraft to use an airstrip to launch a raid in Kampala, Uganda, following a hijacking. 20 were killed and more than 80 were injured.³⁹ One of the higher profile attacks occurred in 1998 in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. American embassies were targeted and resulted in hundreds of deaths. Al-Qaeda targeted both embassies

³⁷ Miguel, Edward. "Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania." *World Politics* 56, no. 03 (2004): 328-362.

³⁸ Derived from The Global Terrorism Database.

<http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=kenya&sa.x=0&sa.y=0&sa=Search>

³⁹ C, Torchia, (2013, October 19). "Kenya mall attack echoes 1980 hotel bombing", *Associated Press*. Oct. 19, 2013

around 10:30am August, 7th 1998, using trucks filled with explosives.⁴⁰ Mombasa was targeted in November of 2002 when an Israeli aircraft was targeted after takeoff from Moi International Airport. This attack was synchronized with another; Israeli tourists were targeted in a hotel-bombing killing 13 and injuring more than 70.⁴¹ These attacks, while deadly, reflect a form of terror disparate from Al-Shabaab.

With the exception of the murder of Kariuki, the attacks were largely targeting non-Kenyans within Kenya. American and Israeli interests within Kenya were insecure, but Kenyans did not live with the very real threat of terror. That is not to say that Kenyan citizens were not perished in violent attacks. However, Kenyans that perished in these attacks did so because they worked in the hotels, embassy buildings, or were aboard targeted flights. That is to say, the level of the, at least perceived, “Kenyanness” or “Christianity” were not the driving force behind violence. Identity was a variable for these attacks, however, at a different level than that of recent terrorism. The attacks that took place in the 1970s-1990s were targeted because of their link to international politics that Kenyan citizens had no impact on. A new wave of terrorism associated with religion brought with it a new version of terror, one that is perceived to be preventable and conducted at the hands of the Muslim and Somali minorities.

Al-Shabaab first became a threat to Kenyans in 2011, and continue remain a legitimate threat to Kenyan citizens. The attacks in Kenya spanning from 2011- 2014,

⁴⁰ Lyman, Princeton N., and J. Stephen Morrison. "The terrorist threat in Africa." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK*- 83, no. 1 (2004): 75-86.

⁴¹ Aronson, Samuel L. "Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in Approaches to Counterterrorism." *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies*: 7, no. 1/2 (2013): 24.

coincide with Operation Linda Nchi⁴², when the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) crossed the border into southern Somalia. Terrorism in Kenya pivoted from targeting western or Israeli interests and persons to targeting Kenya. The most high profile of which has been the September 2013 Westgate Mall attack. Almost 70 people were killed and nearly 200 injured. This attack touched all Kenyans, despite it occurring in an aristocratic neighborhood of Nairobi. Eyewitnesses reported non-Muslims primarily being targeted. While the Westgate shooting has garnered the attention of international media outlets and politicians alike, the majority of attacks have been located on the coast and in the Northeastern province.

Attacks have primarily been located at the periphery of the state,. This coincides with what is known about insurgencies, which posit that ‘fragile state’; control is often absent along the hinterlands.⁴³ Al-Shabaab engaged in attacks on small villages on the coast, or rock quarry sites in the north because these areas are accessible given the porous border and lack of state authority. Somalis in Kenya are predominately located in the Coast and North Eastern providences.⁴⁴ Attackers take advantage of engaging Kenyans where the Somali populations are highest, and through the ‘weakest’ part of the state. This coincides with the analysis of Joel Barkan, a prominent scholar of Kenyan politics. Barkan argues “Mainly along the Indian Ocean coast, the home of most Kenyan Muslims... have long felt neglected by Nairobi, which they view as being controlled by

⁴² Kulinda is the Swahili verb for “protect”, Nchi is Swahili for “country”.

⁴³ Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war." *American political science review* 97, no. 01 (2003): 75-90.

⁴⁴ Derived from 2009 Population & housing census results. Ministry of State for Planning, National Development and Vision 2030.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20130810185221/http://www.knbs.or.ke/docs/PresentationbyMinisterforPlanningrevised.pdf>

"upcountry" Kenyans".⁴⁵ The coastal and northern areas of Kenya are marginalized politically, and populations can be perceived to be at odds with greater Kenya. There is a high concentration of Muslims and Somalis in these areas, which Al-Shabaab takes full advantage of. High-profile attacks such as Westgate are few and far between. The current trend is small-scale, yet deadly attacks of Kenyan citizens, often characterized by the exclusive targeting of non-Muslims. With all Kenyans living with the very real threat of Al-Shabaab, the Kenyan state has been forced to deal with insecurity.

Kenya Reacts

Explosions again rocked Nairobi and Mombasa in March of 2014; as a result in early April, Kenya launched 'Operation Usalama⁴⁶ Watch'. Under the guise of national security, the Somali-Kenyan community has been incriminated.⁴⁷ The Somali-Kenyan enclave of Eastleigh, also known colloquially as "Little Mogadishu", just east of Nairobi, was heavily targeted. Exact numbers are not possible given the lack of transparency of the Kenyan security apparatus, however, NGOs such as Amnesty International has reported thousands of Somalis and Somali-Kenyans have been arrested, with hundreds being forcibly repatriated to Somalia. Those arrested that could not produce proof of citizenship, including refugees, were moved into the Kakuma and Dadaab camps. This security operation illustrates how the Kenyan state treats Eastleigh; as if it were an extension of Somalia and not being a part of 'real' Kenya. Thus it is clear that, to the

⁴⁵ Barkan, Joel D. "Kenya After Moi." *FOREIGN AFFAIRS-NEW YORK*- 83, no. 1 (2004): 87-100.

⁴⁶ Swahili for "Security"

⁴⁷ Amnesty *International*. Retrieved from <https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/05/kenya-somalis-scapegoated-counter-terror-crackdown/>

state, those in Somali populated areas and refugee camps are not ‘real’ Kenyans.

Somali-Kenyans are fundamentally distinct and dissimilar to that of ‘regular’ Kenyans.

Kenyan Security forces have sought to ‘securitize’ Mombasa in a similar fashion to that of Eastleigh. Armed with weapons and legitimacy from the state, police arrested more than 200 during a 3 day operation that ended November 19, 2014th. The target of the raids was the Minaa and Swafaa mosques. Under the purview of receiving ‘intelligence’ that these places of worship were radicalizing youths to perpetrate attacks, police and KDF arrested those in and around the mosques. Although not as indiscriminate as the Eastleigh operation, locals have characterized these attacks as being solely against the predominately Muslim population of the coast. With attacks destroying the tourism industry in coastal Kenya, citizens have been crying out for the state to provide security. The answer to this yearning has resulted in further marginalization and the militarization of the Coast.

The most deadly attack since the Westgate mall incident occurred June 2014. The day after the second Mpeketoni attack, Uhuru Kenyatta took the stage and blamed ethnic rivals for the attacks. Despite Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility, thus threatening the region and its citizens, Kenyatta claimed Islamic terrorists were not the ones who carried out the attacks:

The attack in Lamu was well planned, orchestrated and politically motivated ethnic violence against a Kenyan community, with the intention of profiling and

evicting them for political reasons. This, therefore, was not an Al Shabaab terrorist attack.⁴⁸

Engaging in ‘the ethnic blame-game’ serves two functions. First, Mpeketoni being located near a popular tourist destination, Kenyatta wishes to quell any concerns over possibly terrorist threats. By rejecting (and discrediting) the claims made by Al-Shabaab the Kenyan government is able to assert that terror is not a problem for tourists and the revenue they bring. The American and British government have issued travel warnings urging their citizens to not travel to Kenya; specifically Coastal Kenya. The Coast province is especially vulnerable to a slump in revenue being that it accounts for the majority of its economy.

Secondly, suggesting ethnicity as the cause of the attack allows Uhuru Kenyatta to protect his interests. Mpeketoni is predominately Kikuyu, Kenya’s largest and most powerful ethnic group. Kenyatta, also being Kikuyu, played the ethnic card because he was posturing to the ethnic group, which ensured his winning election. Considering Nairobi is predominately Kikuyu, why would Kenyatta not employ ethnic rhetoric during the Westgate attack? In addition to being the capital, Nairobi is the economic center of Kenya. Any attack on Nairobi is an attack on the country, and as such cannot be framed as being a place purely for Kikuyus. Furthermore, it is not politically advantageous for Kenyatta to outright blame Somalis or to snub a large minority population. Despite Nairobi being a symbol of the country, majority of Kikuyus live in Nairobi. Stating Nairobi attacks as attacks on Kikuyus does not provide a political advantage in the capital

⁴⁸ “Kenya Attacks: Al-Shabab Not Involved- Kenyatta” *BBC Africa*. (Jun 18 2014)
Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-27882084>

more so than Kenyatta already has. A Kikuyu controlled Mpeketoni was constructed by Uhuru's father.

Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta settled Kikuyus in the small coastal town in the 1960s. Those who did not have homes in the Rift Valley or Central provinces were relocated to Mpeketoni, and given land deeds, something the local communities did not possess. Today the Kikuyu community represents a growing bloc of voters in Lamu County and population trends point to their growing influence along the coast. Supporting the most powerful ethnic group in the country, coupled with the added bonus of Kikuyus growing in influence delivers political advantages to Kenyatta (Uhuru).

The binary of either being Al-Shabaab or ethnically motivated violence is misleading. There is no evidence to support the claim that being a member of Al-Shabaab excludes him⁴⁹ from engaging in ethnic violence. Eyewitness accounts of the Mpeketoni attacks coincide with recent Al-Shabaab attacks in Wajir, Mandera, and on the Westgate mall. It is entirely possible, even likely, that those who have been radicalized by any organization would use tactics and methods learned and apply them to strategically important domestic areas. Kenyatta has not provided evidence, although victim blaming under the guise of 'intelligence failures' have shown to be a main tactic of Uhuru's.

In the weeks following the Mpeketoni attack, the governor of Lamu, Issa Timamy was arrested. This coincides with the state's response of the attacks being perpetrated by local political networks. Framing of this instance of insecurity, as being an example of 'the politics of opportunity' for rivals of Kikuyus (and therefore the state), unofficially

⁴⁹ Gendered only because Islamist extremists tend to be men, although not exclusively.

indicts ethnic minorities in Lamu County. Timamy is a member of the United Democratic Forum, an opposition party.

Societal Securitization

Anti-Somali policies are securitizing Kenyan “society”. The society in question is not the nation, or anyone born or immigrated to Kenya in hopes of a better life. Instead the society is what Buzan (1991) refers to as the audience. The Kenyatta regime panders to the wealthy, and politically important Kikuyus. Kenya has experienced influxes of refugees, mostly coming from Somalia. Somalis in Kenya have been marginalized since independence. Inaptitude of the Kenyan state, as well as its structure, ensures that building mass camps that house hundreds of thousands of refugees, but not citizens solves the ‘refugee question’. There lacks a Somali pathway to citizenship within Kenya. During times of ethnic polarization, and even civil war, offering citizenship to a marginalized population intersects with peace, as it did in Côte d’Ivoire.⁵⁰ Instead of using legal state institutions and policies, Kenyatta’s Kenya seeks to securitize ‘true’ Kenyan identity. He does this by pushing his policies in an area of extreme politics, which require extreme, yet “necessary” responses to Somali-Kenyans.

Assigning blame to governors of attacked regions is societal securitization. The indictment of Timany of Lamu, falls in line with the very recent attacks in Wajir and Mandera. Kenyatta addressed the nation in early December and alluded to the fact that it is the responsibility of “All Kenyans” to help with security. Security falls to the shoulders of the state. By sharing responsibility for security, and therefore insecurity, Kenyatta

⁵⁰ Bah, Abu Bakarr. "Democracy and civil war: Citizenship and peacemaking in Côte d’Ivoire." *African Affairs* 109, no. 437 (2010): 597-615.

shifts the burden back to communities that are victimized the most. Kikuyu elites share the notion that ‘true’ Kenyans do not attack each other, and they do not aid the enemy. If they do, their places of worship will be targeted and their locally elected officials will face criminal charges. Kenya has not been immune to ethnic violence. Using coded language and rhetoric, in addition to overt policies that target marginalized non-Kikuyu populations, protects perceptions of Kenyan identity. The newest attacks in Northern Kenya have forced Kenyatta to declare a “War” on Al-Shabaab. As long as Al-Shabaab remains a threat to the Kenyan people, Kenyatta and other Kikuyu elites will use existing security apparatuses of the state to protect Kenyans, instead of building a nation and forging a united Kenya.

A common saying in Kenya is that ‘Kenya is country of 42 tribes, without a nation’. Due to historical and structural variables, nation building has been challenging at best for post-colonial states. Within the African context, examples of true nation building are few and far between. The trend has been to build a state, characterized by centralized power. Kenya has the daunting task of continuing to build a state in the face of a rising insurgency. At times of insecurity politics in Kenya relies on ethnicity. Electoral violence of 2007-2008 was obviously along ethnic lines, and ethnic groups were mobilized top-down. Recent attacks, whether by Al-Shabaab or Al-Shabaab trained ‘ethnic thugs’, represent the most insecure Kenyans have been since the electoral violence.

The Kenyan government engages in an arbitrary fearfulness against ethnic Somalis in Nairobi, and beyond. Kenyan politicians, military leaders, and other elites have failed to answer to the systematic and structural violence against innocent Somalis. The KDF, backed by the Kenyatta regime, receives a blank check that they cash in the

name of exterminating “terrorists”. The securitization that Somali-Kenyans and Muslims experience is ethnic profiling. Mass arrests, predicated on baseless claims, perpetuate the prevailing narrative that Somalis are a threat to national security. Living amongst a particular community, having a specific sounding surname, or practicing a religion that most Kenyans do not practice, is justification enough to be treated like an enemy of the state.

Kenyan government officials control the national narrative on security. They constantly attempt to persuade the population of a specific single cause for the insecurity: the influx of Somalis into the country. The ‘true’ cause of insecurity is of course much more nuanced than political elites would have Kenyans, and the international community, believe. However, the construction of ‘two Kenyas’ is grounded in identity politics, and is manifested through official policies. One of the most egregious policies the Kenyan government engages in the refugee camps in Kakuma and Dadaab.

Kenya houses two of the largest refugee camps in Sub-Saharan Africa. The population of the camps themselves is ethnically homogenous, and the Dadaab refugee camp is almost exclusively a detention center for Somalis. If Somalis are viewed as the cause of insecurity, then the Dadaab camp is viewed as a solution. For years the camp has been sprawling into a town of its own. Somalis risk their lives in hopes of a better future for themselves and their family. Kenya being the economic powerhouse of East Africa shines like a beacon for the region. People walk through the desert controlled by Al-Shabaab in hopes of reaching the promise of economic opportunity, and to possibly become part of a community that provides some of life’s most basic necessities.

However, after risking their lives by trekking through a “failed state”, they are thrown into camps indiscriminately—camps which are forgotten by the government. Not only do these camps house Somali refugees, but also anyone with Somali heritage runs the risk of being detained and transported to Dadaab.

The Dadaab refugee camp is a manifestation of societal securitization. Security alone does not exist, according to Buzan and Waever security is breathed into existence. An issue becomes an issue of security if it is labeled as such. For this to occur a threat must be poised against a referent object—something that is to be preserved. This pushed security into a realm of exceptional politics, which requires an exceptional reaction. When an issue becomes securitized the government must act. To do nothing would be neglectful; governments ought to answer to issues of insecurity. However, the government itself manufactures the insecurity that it is attempting to solve. Empirical insecurity—that is insecurity in actuality, and not just manufactured—is difficult to prove. Descending voices run the risk of being portrayed as being ‘soft on terrorism’. There is no evidence to substantiate the claim that Somalis in Kenya make Kenya more insecure, but the speech acts that the government engages in creates a new reality for Kenya.

‘Securing’ Refugees

Security concerning individuals within Africa is often rooted policies of countries. Refugee policy is one of the few areas of security research, which concerns the policies, and reaction of a state, and how they impact people. Refugees, and how countries react to the possibility of them crossing their borders, are particularly important to African states. Subject? Finds that 28 percent of the world’s refugee population is African, despite only

12 percent of the world population being from Africa⁵¹. Being displaced by either conflict, as was the case of Rwandan and South Sudanese refugees, or driven by famine often caused by state collapse, as was the case of Somali refugees, states who find people who walk to their borders have the daunting dilemma of how to proceed. States have decided to securitize refugees, often in camps. Some states are able to integrate refugees better than others. Tanzania has been more effective than Kenya at passing citizenship laws, and developing the areas refugees occupy.⁵² Of all the methods available in the arsenal of states, it is logical that securitization would be appropriate to address the refugee question. Salehyan and Gleditsch find that refugees flooding into a host country run the risk of spreading conflict⁵³. Framing refugees as threats instead of victims of civil war perpetuates the narrative of Somalis being intrinsically dangerous to the country.

Refugee influx into Kenya is the result of an unpredictable and dangerous situation in Somalia. Instead of investing in housing and incorporating the refugee population into greater Kenya society, the government relegates refugees to remote areas on the countries' periphery. The government fears that, if left in greater Kenya, Al-Shabaab may recruit ethnic Somalis into their ranks.⁵⁴ To combat this dangerous potential, the government concentrates the Somali population to camps that were

⁵¹ Crisp, Jeff. "Africa's refugees: patterns, problems and policy challenges." *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 18, no. 2 (2000): 157-178.

⁵² Milner, James HS. *Sharing the security burden: towards the convergence of refugee protection and state security*. Refugee Studies Centre, 2000.

⁵³ Salehyan, Idean, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Refugees and the spread of civil war." *International Organization* 60, no. 02 (2006): 335-366.

⁵⁴ Mogire Edward, *Victims as Security Threats: Refugee Impact on Host State Security in Africa*, England; Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011, 39-42.

designed to house a fraction of the population that Dadaab camp currently houses. Life support is a constant struggle and the government has not made the refugee camps a priority.

In the eyes of the Kenyan government, refugees are viewed as a threat to national security. The lack of provision of some of the most basic necessities of life runs the risk of 'blowback'. Young refugee populations that do not have secured access to food, water, and shelter are ripe for radicalization. The government fears a radicalized Somali population, while creating the conditions for Al-Shabaab to radicalize. Refugees as a threat are part of the reality that is being shaped by the government. This narrative does not limit the humanitarian crisis that refugees in Kenya are experiencing. Since Kenya has neglected protect human life inside their borders, NGOs fill the void.

International organizations are forced to act when the Kenyan government does not. Ironically, this creates more animosity between the host communities and the refugee population. Institutions seek to lend a helping hand to the incredibly vulnerable refugee population. Funding flows from donors directly to the refugee camps. These funds, while necessary to save lives, create tension among the local population, which is often neglected by the same donors. Kenya is not unique in this regard. Refugees in Cambodia have been given more economic opportunities.⁵⁵ An influx of refugees means more competition for work. Organizations prefer to hire from a pool of individuals who are perceived to be in more need than non-refugees. This practice is the by-product of the

⁵⁵ Gleditsch, Nils. P., Ragnhild Nordås and Idean Salehyan. (2007), "*Climate Change*" and Grigg-Saito, D., Och, S., Liang, S., Toof, R., & Silka, L. "Building on the strengths of a Cambodian refugee community through community-based outreach." *Health Promotion Practice*, (2008).

Kenyan governments' refusal to effectively incorporate refugees into a democratic and inclusive society. Since this practice also has the added benefit of creating more tension, it aids the government's campaign that Somalis are inherently dangerous and pit 'true' Kenyans against the intrusive refugees.

Creating Fear

The reality created is one where the government frames their actions as absolutely necessary, for to do nothing is to jeopardize the existence of a peaceful Kenya.

Extraordinary politics often means undemocratic policies. Somalis being scapegoated and forcibly assigned to refugee camps is of course unbecoming of a democracy. Fear is a tool that can be employed to justify undemocratic and exceptional politics. The audience—non-Somali, Christian Kenyans—is the recipient of the propaganda that Somalis and Muslims are synonymous with terrorist. The threat that is framed by the government is aimed at the very identity of Kenya. The country, and its citizens, is in jeopardy—so goes the strategic logic of the authorities. Those with power frame the threat as a crisis that supersedes potentially competing crises. Authorities need the audience to accept the threat legitimate. If the audience does not share the sense of urgency, the threat will cease to allow undemocratic and exceptional politics.

The problem constructed is that Somalis represent an existential danger to Kenyan security. Exceptional problems require exceptional solutions. The Kenyan security arm, predominately made up of the KDF, extends the full might of its capabilities against, which are diametrically opposed to a free, open, and inclusive society. Securitization then becomes a paradox. In the names of national security, and protecting a democratic

society, the government scales back democratic processes and scapegoats ethnic and religious minorities. Through the power of identity construction, deconstruction, and shaping, national security is protected and the window of terrorism appears to close. Al-Shabaab is Somali and Muslim; therefore Somalis and Muslims are the cause of the increased insecurity in the country. Innocent families answer the doors that are being torn down by security forces. Individuals who are Kenyan born citizens are needlessly harassed. At times they are arrested or detained without cause. These are the costs that Somalis are paying for in exchange for a free and peaceful Kenya. However, the free and peaceful Kenya that the authorities strive for is not for every Kenyan; it is predominantly for Kikuyu and Christians.

Thousands of Kenyans have been arrested in operations designed to provide security, with an added by-product of perpetuating the governments' narrative. Numerous NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have documented several accounts of abuses. Kenyan security forces have engaged beating and demanding money from Somalis. Security operations have caused unintended consequences. Instead of providing security, these abuses have triggered Al-Shabaab to entrench themselves in Kenyan communities, and to conduct attacks in retaliation.⁵⁶ Continued abuse of citizens must be constantly legitimized. Kenyan Senator Boni Khalwale has attempted to construct a link between Al-Shabab and all ethnic Somalis (Khalwale in Trouble, 2015).⁵⁷ It would be advantageous for the government to go after individuals who are responsible

⁵⁶ Anderson, David M., and Jacob McKnight. "Kenya at war: Al-Shabaab and its enemies in Eastern Africa." *African Affairs* 114, no. 454 (2015): 1-27.

⁵⁷ "Khalwale in trouble over Somali claims" *Daily Nation*. (April 30 2015) Retrieved from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Khalwale-in-trouble-over-Somali-claims/-/1056/2702662/-/vq9tpaz/-/index.html>

for attacks. However, the government is more concerned with the arbitrary targeting and profiling of ethnic Somalis than they are with bringing criminals and terrorists to justice.

Kenyan politicians have engaged in anti-Somali discourse. After the horrific killings at Garissa University College Ahmednasir Abdullahi, a city lawyer is quoted as claiming, “The attack in Garissa is obviously the work of Kenyan Somalis. Let us not blame Somalia’s Al-Shabaab. This is local”.⁵⁸ Despite attackers of Garissa being Kenyan born, the government seeks to build a fence along the Kenyan-Somali border.⁵⁹ This has brought criticism from William Ruto, a prominent member of the Kenyan opposition and current Deputy President of Kenya, sees parallels with U.S. policies stating “The way America changed after 9/11 is the way Kenya will change after Garissa”.⁶⁰ Ruto’s comments reflect the common narrative of blaming an entire ethnic community instead of the real causes of insecurity. A border will not secure Kenya, as a corrupt and inept security force are used to accepting bribes. Even if Kenya has the ability to build a fence or to keep out Somalis, the actions and lack of professionalization of ensure the increased insecurity in Kenya.

Kenyan security forces lack true operational capacity to conduct counter-terror operations. The problem for this lies in two crucial components to a sound counter-insurgency strategy. First, security forces require effective equipment and training. A

⁵⁸ “Politicians behind attack, says Ahmednasir Abdullahi” *Daily Nation*. (April 7 2015) Retrieved from <http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Ahmednasir-Abdullahi-Garissa-Attack/-/1056/2678916/-/n0es86z/-/index.html>

⁵⁹ “Kenya erects a wall along border with Somalia to keep out al-Shabaab” *The Telegraph*. (April 22, 2015) Retrieved from <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/kenya/11556269/Kenya-erects-a-wall-along-border-with-Somalia-to-keep-out-al-Shabaab.html>

⁶⁰ “Kenya erects a wall along border” *The Telegraph*.

professionalized security apparatus has the correct tools to conduct security operations. Weapons, vehicles, uniforms, and other equipment set them apart from their adversaries. Ill-equipped forces with limited training are not able to conduct counter-terror operations. Military capacity can be used as a proxy to measure state strength.⁶¹ States that do not provide security, due to lack of capacity or incentive, are institutionally weak. It is no surprise that Kenyan security forces have limited operational capability due to Kenya ranking in the top 20 most fragile states eight times in the past ten years.

Despite being the economic powerhouse of East Africa, Kenya has not made a credible commitment to security. In FY 2013 the Kenyan government spent only 2% of their GDP on defense.⁶² Despite a rising insurgency and the increased activity of a terrorist organization, the Kenyan government has decided not to invest in their defense. A security force ill prepared to confront Al-Shabaab on a tactical level must resort to its coercive capability characterized by its exercise of force.

The local population is critical to any counter-insurgency or counter-terror campaign. Within the American context, the battle for “Hearts and minds” is viewed as important to the kinetic fight. Some American military leaders have even gone so far as to describe the local population as the key to fighting an insurgency. Abuses by Kenyan security forces limit their capability to bring the fight to Al-Shabaab. The Kenyan government must rely on communities, which have high concentrations of ethnic Somalis and Kenyans. However, the economic and social marginalization, coupled with the scapegoating, of Somalis pits Somalis against ‘normal’ Kenyans. Ethnic Somalis and

⁶¹ Hendrix, Cullen S. "Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict." *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 3 (2010): 273-285.

⁶² Data taken from Security Assistance Monitor Retrieved from <http://www.securityassistance.org/kenya>

Muslims are less likely to cooperate and with security forces that target their communities. Al-Shabaab attacks are often along religious lines in order to strengthen their ties with Muslim and Somali Kenyans. In return, when security forces blindly paint Somalis and Muslims with a broad brush, they are driving people into the arms of Al-Shabaab.

Security forces must always keep the interests of the community they are serving at the forefront of their mandate. The current situation in Kenya has created an environment where minority communities of ethnic Somalis and Muslims must grip with not only Al-Shabaab's growing presence, but also the actions of security forces that are directed to protect the community. There is much skepticism surrounding the effectiveness of community policing in Kenya. For one it is not entirely clear how security forces should be recruited and deployed. A Luo police officer deployed to the Coast, or a Kikuyu soldier conducting an operation in the North Eastern province may not be motivated to provide security to a community they do not belong to.

Uhuru Kenyatta's Approach to Security

President Uhuru Kenyatta approaches security in Kenya due to the circumstances that brought him to power. The 2007 national election ensured President Mwai Kibaki's victory, but was underscored by violence. Electoral violence was experienced due to an incredibly close election in which the winner enjoys the spoils of governance. Thousands were killed and more than 2 million became displaced as a result of the violence.⁶³ Kenyatta was at the center of controversy. The International Criminal Court (ICC)

⁶³ Mueller, Susanne D. "The political economy of Kenya's crisis." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2 (2008): 185-210.

indicted Kenyatta as being an organizer of the *mungiki*, politicized gangs, which brought havoc during the crisis. Prosecutors at The Hague were forced to drop the charges due to a lack of evidence.⁶⁴ While the ICC could not successfully bring Kenyatta to justice, civil society groups in Kenya (especially those located on the coast) posit that the current President is involved in egregious human rights abuses.⁶⁵

Despite the ICC and civil society groups viewing Kenyatta as having blood on his hands, he was elected President of Kenya in 2013. To those critical of the Kenyatta regime, his name is synonymous with violence. The violent, predominately Kikuyu, *mungiki* gangs were mobilized top-down. These groups operated in a Mafioso like fashion before the election, however, uncertainty surrounding who the winner would be (who would have access to state resources) led elites to take the reins off of the violent gang.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ "ICC drops Uhuru Kenyatta charges for Kenya ethnic violence". *BBC Africa*. (Dec. 5 2014) Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-30347019>

⁶⁵ "World Report 2015: Kenya Human Rights Watch" Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/kenya>

⁶⁶ Mueller. "The Political economy of Kenya's crisis".

CHAPTER 3: SECURITY FRAMES OF THE 'SECOND' KENYA

Where as the previous chapter investigate and explains security from the point of view of the government of Kenya, this chapter expounds on how citizens of Coastal Kenya frame security. Securitization employed by the government is done so under the guise of protecting the masses, while benefiting the political elites. While government policies and actions are important for analyzing the construction of security, it is only half of the story. The other halves, of course, are the citizens themselves. Are the frames and narratives perpetuated by the government reflected in the general population? Due to the limits of the interview sample, this question is outside of the scope of this thesis. It is possible to ascertain, given the sample provided, is whether the government is acting in the best interests of the very communities that face actual insecurity? To answer this question, 25 semi-structured interviews were collected in June of 2014 in Malindi Kenya.

How do individuals, who face the real threat of violence, frame security?

Throughout the summer of 2014, Kenya's coast has feel victim to several attacks. Tourists, and locals have been targeted alike. As a result, Western states have issued travel warnings to the once sought after paradise destination. While travel warnings garner international media attention, Kenyans have been the victims of the bloodiest of attacks. Without the input of the local community, the picture of security is incomplete.

The interviews collected present two frames of security. First, insecurity can cause economic devastation. Coastal Kenya is especially vulnerable to fluctuations of tourism revenue. The second major frame is responsibility of the national government. Responsibility has two dimensions. The first being that citizens recognize the government

in Nairobi has the ability to provide security, yet do not. While it is true that security apparatus of Kenya is underfunded, and unprofessional, respondents realize that these problems are the fault of the government.

This chapter has two major components. First I explain, through data provided by interviews, the two major components of security that is most salient. Next I address some surprises from the interviews. Respondents tended to not invoke religion as a main driver of the insecurity. This is interesting given the heavy religious and ethnic overtones the government involves itself with. Table 1 depicts the most common frames and associated claims.⁶⁷

Economic Security

Comparative to other countries in East Africa, Kenya is wealthy. The East African Community (EAC), which consists of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda has generally enjoyed economic prowess. If the EAC is a rising tower, Kenya is the foundation. The port in Mombasa serves not only Kenya, but the region. Realizing the importance of the Mombasa port, Uhuru Kenyatta along with other leaders, agreed to build a railway connecting Mombasa to Kigali.⁶⁸ Mombasa's port is not the sole reason for the strong economic position Kenya is in. Historically, Kenya has experienced a more privatized economy than its neighbors. *Ujamaa* failed to yield any economic results other than a strong centrally planned economy.⁶⁹ Realizing the importance tourism plays into

⁶⁷ Based on 25 semi-structured interviews. Malindi, Kenya. June 5-30, 2014.

⁶⁸ "Kenyatta Launches New Rail Line". *Citizen Digital*. (Nov. 28, 2013). Retrieved from <http://citizentv.co.ke/news/kenyatta-launches-new-rail-line/>

⁶⁹ Hydén, Göran. *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry*. Univ of California Press, 1980.

the economic activity of the Coast, Muslim citizens conflate terrorist attacks with dips in income.

Natural resources such as pristine beaches attract thousands of tourists to Coastal Kenya every year. The Coast is one of the more underdeveloped regions in Kenya. Jobs and other economic activity is predicated on tourism. Half of the interviewees mentioned when the season is low their jobs are cut. Kenyan labor laws do not require minimum wage. Neither full time nor part time jobs are guaranteed. As one worker at a restaurant put it “When there are no Wazungu⁷⁰ there are no jobs.”⁷¹

Due to the importance of tourism in the coasts’ economy, nearly all of the interviewees reported that the Nairobi based government has done a poor job developing the coast economically. Of the 25 interviewed, nearly all mentioned employment opportunities as being a paramount issue for the coast. Mombasa, being particularly important for Kenya as well as other East African countries, has the fortune of housing the biggest port in the region. Smaller towns along the coast rely on tourism. Tourism brings with it not only revenue for local businesses, but also the chance for employment. During the offseason, many hotel workers engage in other forms of work. This can range from subsistence agriculture in the more rural regions, to fishing. Of the men that were interviewed (about half of the 25), 6 of them fished in the offseason, however, did not feel that it was adequate to sustain a living. Gender seemed to not be a factor in that of the women interviewed, 5 identified without their current job they would be unable to

⁷⁰ Wazungu literally translates to visitors, however, culturally it is known to mean Westerners

⁷¹ Semi-structured interview. Malindi, Kenya. June 18, 2014.

send their children to school. These secondary jobs are not intended to be a sustainable source of income throughout the year. Perceptions of insecurity can lower prospects for tourism. Travel warnings issued by countries in Europe and North America can have detrimental effects to the economy of coastal Kenya. With excellent bio-diversity and pristine white sand beaches, Kenya can reap the benefits of these scarce natural resources. Akama Finds that insecurity, whether perceived or actual, lowers employment prospects for the region and has the ability to shrink the economy of the country⁷². Security being linked to tourism economics may be a consequence of the research site. Malindi has historically been an Italian tourist destination. Of the attacks, which took place, none were in Malindi proper. While many residents of Malindi have contacts in Lamu and Mombasa areas, how they view the potential impacts of an insecure coast are framed with employment. The coast is, however, especially susceptible to tourist fluctuations in a time of insecurity. While experienced tourists tend to downplay terror threats⁷³, the possibility of new revenue being introduced to the region is severely limited.

Nairobi's Responsibility

Like citizens of any modern country, coastal Kenyans place the burden of security on the state. It is in this sense that the state is viewed as a parent, who is supposed to provide the basic goods in order for a life to be fulfilling. A security apparatus is an umbrella of which all citizens are to be afforded. This normative conceptualization of security is widespread amongst coastal Kenyans. It is in this sense that security can be

⁷² Akama, John S. "The role of government in the development of tourism in Kenya." *International Journal of Tourism Research* 4, no. 1 (2002): 1-14.

⁷³ Lepp, Andrew, and Heather Gibson. "Tourist roles, perceived risk and international tourism." *Annals of Tourism Research* 30, no. 3 (2003): 606-624.

viewed as a way to operationalize a Kenya's perceived ability to provide governance. In the face of the credible threats, Kenyan citizens look to Nairobi. All interviewees expect the government to provide security, and all but 3 stated the government is not fulfilling this obligation. More than half of interviews place personal blame on Uhuru Kenyatta.

Not only is the state responsible for the provision of security, it is thought that the state is actively driving insecurity along the coast. This is due to the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) being actively engaged in operations within Somalia. Citizens of the coast reject Kenyatta's assertion that his ethnic rivals are to blame for the slew of attacks. When queried what the biggest threat on the coast is, Al-Shabaab is mentioned. Several men, and most women who were interviewed, declared that if the KDF were to cease their missions and operations in Somalia, Al-Shabaab would limit their presence on the coast. Kenya has experienced attacks outside of the coastal region. Infamously, the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi shook the country. As a response, Kenya has increased the KDF presence in Somalia. The Kenya-Somali border has been closed since 2011. The Kenya-Somali border remains a contentious topic in political discourse. Politicians in Madera and Nairobi claim that Kenya will build a wall along the entirety of the border.⁷⁴ Kenya, however, neither has the capacity or the finances to build a fence along the entire border. Assuming Kenya did, it would not limit attacks on Kenyan soil, given that Kenyan citizens have conducted attacks after being radicalized. 20 interviewees were concerned that they would not be able to contact family or business partners if Kenya

⁷⁴ Ismail Kushkush. "Kenya envisions a Border Wall That Keeps Shabab Violence Out" *The New York Times*. (Apr. 21, 2015). Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/africa/kenya-plans-to-build-a-border-wall-that-keeps-shabab-violence-out.html>.

limits the ability to travel to and from Somalia.⁷⁵ A border fence would surely limit the freedom of ethnic Somalis and Muslims. Moreover, by the government engaging in the speech-act of planning to build a border fence, ethnic Somalis and Muslims live in increased fear. 17 of the 25 interviewees claimed that just by the government publically announcing their plan to build a fence conjures fear for reprisals should there be an altercation near a border crossing.⁷⁶

A common theme that interviewees mention is the ongoing operations by the Kenyan Defense forces and Air Force in Somalia. 23 interviewees claimed that Kenya can stop Al-Shabaab by if Kenya would stop ground and air operations in Somalia. This sentiment is shared along the Coast. Instead of ethnic Somalis and Muslims being the driver of terrorism, these responses reverse the causal arrow and shift the blame to the Kenyan government as causing their insecurity. There is no one single cause of insecurity and terrorism in Kenya, and there is little evidence to support the claim that Al-Shabaab would stop operations in Kenya if Kenya would not engage Al-Shabaab in Somalia. What is of interest is the fact that citizens turn around and blame the security actions of the Kenyan military, when confronted with the notion that their communities cause insecurity. Further empirical research is needed to determine the validity of the claim that Kenya brings terrorism to its soil.

Unexpected Findings

Of the differences and cleavages, which could be mobilized, there are some surprises. With the coast being predominately Muslim in a Christian majority country, it would be expected that discourse on religious differences would be employed.

⁷⁵ Semi-structured interviews. June, 2014. Malindi, Kenya.

⁷⁶ Semi-structured interviews. June, 2014. Malindi, Kenya.

Surprisingly, no interviewee mentioned the possibility of a Christian hegemony being employed in Nairobi. There was only one interviewee, which did not identify as a Muslim. The rest of the lot did not mention mistreatment or marginalization of Kenyan Muslims. While the coast does remain more than 90% Muslim, there may lack a critical mass for political mobilization. In certain ethnic cleavages are mobilized politically in Malawi and not in Zambia due to the proportions of the groups being a higher percent of the population in Malawi as opposed to Zambia.⁷⁷ Furthermore, security may be viewed as not being a tenant of Islam. When the Quran was written there was no sense of any Westphalian state system, so it is logical that religious justification for a state to provide security is lacking. Rhetoric and discourse of justice, however, is popular amongst coastal Muslims. This is not an East African phenomenon; in Northern Nigeria, Muslims frame democracy and freedom of religion as a form of justice.⁷⁸ While *si haki* (Kiswahili for no justice) is used as way to describe traditional Nairobi-coast relations, of which security is a fact, it is not generally declared as a Muslim trope.

Instead of religion being a major cleavage of interest, geography is a common theme that is discussed. All but 5 interviewees referred to those from other parts of Kenya as being from “Up- country”. When queried as to what up-country meant, the prevailing definition of an up-country Kenyan was someone from Nairobi, and usually referenced being them as being in seats of power. Two individuals went so far as to mention up-

⁷⁷ For a natural experiment on this see Posner, Daniel N. "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi." *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4 (2004): 529-545.

⁷⁸ Kendhammer, Brandon. "The Sharia controversy in Northern Nigeria and the politics of Islamic law in new and uncertain democracies." *Comparative Politics* 45, no. 3 (2013): 291-311.

country Kenyans having special privileges in the western provinces.⁷⁹ Geography is linked to ethnicity. Ethnic groups tend to exist as enclaves within urban and rural areas. It is beneficial, as it is clandestine, to mention geographical differences as a hidden meaning for ethnicity. This gives the belief that “the ethnic card” is not being played, while still being able to criticize a select group of individuals.

⁷⁹ Western Kenya is not as developed as Nairobi or the Rift Valley, this may be an example of the perceptions of a disadvantaged ethnic group.

CONCLUSION

The central argument that I have argued is that security varies among the Kenyan government and its citizens. Kenyan authorities extend the security apparatus of the state to protect their political interests. By blaming and scapegoating Somalis and Muslims the government has the benefit of appearing to be concerned with the security of the country, while at the same time protecting a privileged powerful ethnic group, the Kikuyu. Variations between official Kenyan security policy and perceptions of security are great, yet they are intrinsically linked. Realizing that the state is the entity that is to provide security is a facet of modern nation-states.

Citizens from Laos to Sweden seek security. Some states are better equipped to provide security than others. States respond to incentives, and as such, if there are no institutions in place to hold governments accountable, they will not be encouraged to keep the entire population safe. Democracies are better equipped to provide security, among other public goods, due to the possibility that if politicians do not hold up what they ought to do—ensure security—then they run the risk of being voted out.

Ostensibly Kenya is a democracy, however, like many post-colonial countries democratization is a one step forward, two steps back process. Electoral violence of 2007/08 illustrates how elections are incredibly important within Kenya. The issue was that elections were more important than obeying the rules of the game. When “democrats” are desperate, they may result to manipulating ethnicity for personal gain. While the current securitization process in Kenya is not a fate of ‘winner takes all’, leaders are responding to incentives they face. It is more advantageous for Kenyatta to

solidify base support of Christians and Kikuyu than it is to engage in constructive dialogue. There is no silver bullet to cure Kenya of Al-Shabaab, however, standing by and scapegoating the communities that live with threats from Al-Shabaab will only drive more Somalis and Muslims into the arms of Al-Shabaab.

A political blame-game is being engaged by elites in Nairobi. President Uhuru Kenyatta was quick to blame ethnic rivals, and not Al-Shabaab for the attacks on Mpeketoni, a manufactured Kikuyu stronghold. This serves the function of taking advantage of a situation in which he, and other elites, stands to gain. Despite Al-Shabaab claiming responsibility for the slew of attacks in Mombasa and Lamu, political and ethnic rivals, engage in discourse, which does little to improve security. The Kenyan case illustrates how politics remains very much ethnic and divisive. Discourse surrounding unity and a Kenyan nation does exist, however, if the government is not able to provide security to the entirety of the electorate. National identity is only as important as the spoils, which can be gained. Until Kenya is able to cultivate institutions that incentivize elites to stop ethnic profiling, Somalis and Muslims will not enjoy security from Al-Shabaab and human rights abuses alike.

The interviews yield some expected results. First, security and economic considerations are linked. This is because during times of insecurity, the coast has experienced fewer tourists visiting. Travel security warnings from the United Kingdom and the United States cripples the economy of Coastal Kenya. While it is true that the government in Nairobi also feels the pain of such powerful Western countries whether the coast thrives or struggles is predicated on tourism. Second, security is the sole responsibility of the Kenyan national government. Insecurity is viewed as being a

provision of the state. During times of insecurity, as was the case during the summer of 2014, citizens of coastal Kenya placed blame on the Nairobi based government.

What is surprising is how Islam is important to citizens personally, yet but is not invoked with regards to security policy. This could be due to a lack of a critical mass of Muslims. Despite Muslims being heavily concentrated in the Coast and North Eastern Provinces—relative to the rest of the country—they realize that a gaining a winning coalition, nationally, is nearly impossible. This rationalist explanation is not all-inclusive. Religion (specifically Islam) in Kenya exists in a space where it can be molded and shaped to guide political decisions, albeit not about security. Security exists in a space that citizens contend should be provided to all of Kenya.

Finally, this study has potential methodological implications. Insecurity in Africa is not a phenomenon that is unique to Kenya or East Africa. From Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, to the insurgency in Azawad in Northern Mali, citizens live in states of insecurity. Securitization theory has the ability to travel to various parts of Africa and beyond. Chad and Cameroon have committed to the defeat of Boko Haram, and both have passed bans on Muslim dress.⁸⁰ Securitization theory may have the ability to explain other conflicts in Africa, and beyond, but ‘Securitization’ as a theory needs to be further developed, to test its ability to travel. This study may serve as groundwork to learn more about how individuals view their parent government. Efficacy of governance is in the eye

⁸⁰ “Cameroon Bans Islamic Face Veil” *BBC Africa*. (Jul. 16 2015) Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33553041>, and “Chad Bans Islamic Face Veil After Suicide Attack” *BBC Africa*. (Jun. 17 2015). Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33166220>

of the citizen. There is no substitute for local populations and their notions of security and governance.



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